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Abstract - We proposed a new physical layer technique that
can enhance the security of cooperative relay communications.
The proposed approach modifies the decoded message at the
relay according to the unique channel state between the relay
and the destination such that the destination can utilize the
modified message to its advantage while the eavesdropper
cannot. We present a practical method for securely sharing the
modification rule between the legitimate partners and present
the secrecy outage probability in a quasi-static fading channel.
It is demonstrated that the proposed scheme can provide a
significant improvement over other schemes when the relay
can successfully decode the source message.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there have been considerable efforts devoted
to using the channel to provide security in wireless communi-
cations. It is shown in [1] that fading alone guarantees that
information-theoretic security is achievable, even when the
eavesdropper has a better average SNR than the legitimate
receiver. A traditional approach to enhancing the secrecy rate
is to introduce interference (jamming) into the channel so as to
harm the eavesdropper’s ability to eavesdrop while strength-
ening the ability for legitimate entities to communicate. This
idea has appeared in the literature under the name of artificial
noise [2], cooperative jamming (CJ) [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], or
noise forwarding (NF) [8], [9].
In this paper we propose a new physical layer technique that
can enhance the security of cooperative relay communications.
Unlike traditional approaches in which no context (message) is
sent by the relay, in the proposed scheme the relay decodes the
source message X and forwards a modified message X ′ to the
destination such that the intended destination can utilize X ′ to
its advantage while the eavesdropper cannot. The basic idea is
to exploit the unique physical channel state between the relay
and the destination as the inherent shared secret in sharing
X ′ −X without exchanging any information about X ′ −X .
Once the difference X ′ − X is known at the destination, it
can be canceled from the modified message X ′ to get the
original message X , while the eavesdropper without knowing
the difference1 cannot extract X from X ′. The additional
information about X provided by the relay can improve the
rate towards the intended destination without improving the
1The eavesdropper cannot determine the physical channel state between the
legitimate nodes as long as the former is more than half of the wavelength
away from the latter.
rate towards the eavesdropper. Hereafter, the proposed scheme
will be referred to as modify-and-forward (MF).
We present a practical method for securely sharing the
difference X ′ − X (or modification rule in general) by ex-
ploiting the unique physical channel state between the legit-
imate partners. We characterize the security level in a quasi-
static fading environment by computing the secrecy outage
probability that provides the fraction of fading realizations for
which the wireless channel cannot support a target secure rate.
We compare the secrecy outage probability of the proposed
scheme with that of direct transmission (DT), decode-and-
forward (DF), and CJ under different system setups.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider the cooperative relay communication system
shown in Fig. 1 in which a source (S) communicates with a
destination (D) with the help of a relay (R) in the presence
of a eavesdropper (E). We assume that each node carries a
single omnidirectional antenna. Channels between all pairs
of nodes are modeled as independent quasi-static Rayleigh
fading channels: fading coefficients remain constant during
the transmission of an entire codeword but they change from
one codeword to another according to a complex Gaussian
distribution.
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Fig. 1. Cooperative relay communication model for modify-and-forward
relaying.
In the first phase, S broadcasts the message X to D and E.
In the second phase, the relay decodes the message transmitted
by S, modifies the decoder output to X ′ and broadcasts X ′
to D and E. We require the relay to fully decode the source
message X and the source to remain silent during the second
phase. We assume that X and X ′ are of length n and are
independently chosen from a Gaussian random codebook of
M codewords. We also assume that each codeword is chosen
with equal probability and that E[X ] = E[X ′] = 0 and
E[||X ||2]/n = E[||X ′||2]/n = P . Thus the total transmission
power is 2P .
2The received signals at the destination that are originated
from the source and relay are, respectively, given by
Ysd = hsdX +Nsd (1)
Yrd = hrdX
′ +Nrd (2)
where hij is the channel gain between the node i and node j,
and Nij is white Gaussian noise with mean zero and variance
σ2n. Once X ′−X is known at the destination, it can be removed
from Yrd to get
Y ′rd = Yrd − hrd(X
′ −X) (3)
= hrdX +Nrd (4)
and X can be decoded based on Ysd and Y ′rd.
We assume that the eavesdropper knows that the message
is modified by the relay. However, without knowing the
difference X ′ −X , it has to discard the signal received from
the relay Yre = hreX ′ + Nre and decode X based on the
signal received from the source only:
Yse = hseX +Nse (5)
where hse is the channel gain between the source and the
eavesdropper and Nse is the noise. This is because Yre does
not provide any information about X unless X ′−X is known.
The question is how to achieve the agreements on message
modification secretly between the relay and the destination.
Only when two nodes share the same modification rule they
can achieve high secrecy rate. Our approach is based on
the uniqueness and reciprocity of wireless fading channel.
The reciprocity theory demonstrates that bidirectional wireless
channel states should be identical between two transceivers
during the channel’s coherence time [10]. We use this unique
channel state as the inherent shared secret between the relay
and the destination for message modification and restora-
tion. As long as the eavesdropper is more than half of the
wavelength away from legitimate communicators, the channel
states he observed should be independent to the channel state
between the legitimate ones [11]. This means the eavesdropper
can never eavesdrop the secret X ′ − X shared between
legitimate communicators. Since the legitimate communicators
do not exchange any information about X ′−X , our approach
provides a strong security. The uniqueness of the wireless
channel between two locations has also been utilized in
authenticating legitimate users [12].
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this section we derive the secrecy outage probability
which provides the fraction of fading realizations for which the
wireless channel cannot support a target secrecy rate of R. It
provides a security metric for the situation where the source
and destination have no channel state information about the
eavesdropper.
A. Modify-and-Forward
The maximum rate at which the relay and the destination
can reliably decode the message X is given by [13]
Cd = min
{
1
2
log2
(
1 + |hsr|
2P/σ2n
)
,
1
2
log2
(
1 + (|hsd|
2 + |hrd|
2)P/σ2n
)} (6)
where the factor 1/2 accounts for the two-phase transmission.
Similarly, the maximum rate at which E can reliably decode
the message X is
Ce =
1
2
log2
(
1 + |hse|
2P/σ2n
) (7)
because the eavesdropper cannot utilize the modified message
which is sent by the relay. Then, the instantaneous secrecy
capacity between S and D is [14]
Cs = max(Cd − Ce, 0) (8)
Communication is secure if the instantaneous secrecy ca-
pacity Cs is higher than the target secrecy rate R (b/s/Hz). If
Cs < R, then security is compromised and secrecy outage oc-
curs. The secrecy outage probability for the proposed scheme
can be shown to be
Po(R) = P (Cs < R) (9)
= 1−
1
γrd − γsd
(
1 +
γrd
γsr
)
e
−(22R−1)
(
1
γsr
+ 1
γrd
)
×
[
1
1
γsr
+ 1γrd
−
1
2−2R
γse
+ 1γsr +
1
γrd
]
+
1
γrd − γsd
(
1 +
γsd
γsr
)
e
−(22R−1)
(
1
γsr
+ 1
γsd
)
×
[
1
1
γsr
+ 1γsd
−
1
2−2R
γse
+ 1γsr +
1
γsd
]
(10)
where γsd = E[|hsd|2]P/σ2n, γrd = E[|hrd|2]P/σ2n, γse =
E[|hse|
2]P/σ2n, and γre = E[|hre|2]P/σ2n. Proof of (10) is
provided in Appendix A.
B. Direct Transmission
For the direct transmission (DT), within a transmission slot,
the source transmits its n encoded symbols directly to the
destination using the available transmit power of 2P . The
secrecy outage probability with the DT is given by [1]
Po(R) = 1−
γsd
γsd + 2Rγse
exp
(
−
2R − 1
2γsd
)
(11)
where the factor 2 in front of γsd accounts for the total transmit
power of 2P .
C. Decode-and-Forward
Like MF, decode-and-forward (DF) is also a two-phase
scheme. The first phase is the same as in the MF scheme. In the
second phase, the relay decodes the information transmitted
by the source and re-encodes it using the same codeword as
the source to transmit the information to D. Thus the total
transmission power is 2P . The secrecy outage probability with
the DF is given by [7]
Po(R) =
a(γre)− a(γse)
γre − γse
+
γsr2
−2Ra(γse)(h(γse, γsd)− h(γse, γrd))
(γre − γse)(γrd − γsd)
−
γsr2
−2Ra(γre)(h(γre, γsd)− h(γre, γrd))
(γre − γse)(γrd − γsd)
(12)
3where
h(x, y) =
γsr
x(1 + γsr/y) + γsr2−2R
(13)
a(x) =
x2
γsr2−2R + x
exp
(
−
2−2R − 1
x
)
(14)
D. Cooperative Jamming
Various cooperative jamming (CJ) schemes that involve the
transmission of jamming signals from different nodes have
been proposed [3], [4], [6]. In this paper we consider the
cooperative jamming scheme where, while S transmits, the
relay transmits a jamming signal that is independent of the
source message with the purpose of confounding E. The
jamming signal, white Gaussian noise, causes interference at
both D and E. The total transmission power2 is 2P as the
source and relay transmits with power P . The secrecy outage
probability for the CJ is given by [3]
Po(R) = 1−
2−κ
γrdγre
γre(
κ+ 1γrd −
β
γre
)
+
2−κ
γrdγre
(
κ+
1
γrd
−
β
γre
)
−2
×
[
β
(
κ+
1
γrd
−
β
γre
+ 1
)
Ω
(
1 + β
γre
)
+
(
κ+
1
γrd
−
β
γre
− β
)
× Ω
(
1 + β
β
(
κ+
1
γrd
))]
(15)
where κ = (22R − 1)/γsd, β = 22Rγse/γsd, and Ω(x) =
exE1(x) where E1(x) =
∫
∞
x
u−1e−udu.
E. Numerical Results
Fig. 2 shows the secrecy outage probability, Po(R), versus
the average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) between the source
and the eavesdropper, γse. As expected the secrecy outage
probability increases with increasing γse because the rate
at which the eavesdropper can reliably decode the message
increases as the channel condition between the source and
itself improves. It can also be seen that the improvement
provided by MF over DF is more significant at lower γse.
This is because the eavesdropper relies sorely on the channel
between the source and eavesdropper in MF, while in DF
the eavesdropper can rely on the channel between the relay
and itself when γse is low. Similarly, in DT the eavesdropper
relies sorely on the channel between the source and itself and
therefore the secrecy outage probability depends heavily on
γse.
Fig. 3 shows the secrecy outage probability, Po(R), versus
the average SNR between the source and the relay, γsr. For
DF and MF schemes, the relay has to decode the source
message in order to provide any additional information to
the destination. Therefore, if γsr is low, the secrecy outage
probability for DF and MF is high because the relay cannot
decode the source message. However, if γsr is high enough
2The total transmission power of CJ schemes in [4], [6] is 3P because each
of three nodes (source, relay, and destination) transmits with power P .
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Fig. 2. Secrecy outage probability, Po(R), versus average SNR between
source and eavesdropper, γse (dB); R = 0.1b/s/Hz, γsd = 10dB, γsr =
20dB, γrd = 20dB, γre = 15dB.
such that the relay can decode the source message, then it
can provide additional information to the destination, which
increases the secrecy capacity. At sufficiently high γsr, the
secrecy outage probability for DF and MF remains constant
because all other channel gains are assumed to be constant.
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Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability, Po(R), versus average SNR between
source and relay, γsr (dB); R = 0.1b/s/Hz, γsd = 10dB, γse = 10dB,
γrd = 20dB, γre = 15dB.
Fig. 4 shows the secrecy outage probability, Po(R), versus
the target secrecy rate R. It can be seen that the improvement
that MF provides over the traditional approaches is more
significant when the target secrecy rate R is smaller. However,
if R is above a threshold, DT provides the smallest secrecy
outage probability, although the secrecy outage probability in
that rate region is unacceptably high. It can also be seen from
Figs. 2-4 that MF can always provide a lower secrecy outage
probability than DF under any channel conditions and rates.
IV. CONCLUSION
We proposed a new physical layer technique that can
enhance the security of cooperative relay communications.
The proposed approach modifies the decoded message at the
relay according to the unique channel state between the relay
and the destination such that the destination can utilize it
to its advantage while the eavesdropper cannot. We derived
the secrecy outage probability in quasi-static fading channel,
and compared with direct transmission, decode-and-forward,
cooperative jamming under different system setups. Numerical
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Fig. 4. Secrecy outage probability Po(R) versus rate R (b/s/Hz); γsd =
10dB, γsr = 20dB, γrd = 20dB, γse = 10dB, γre = 15dB.
results reveal that each scheme provides an advantage over
the others depending on the channel gains and secrecy rates,
although the proposed scheme can always provide a lower
secrecy outage probability than decode-and-forward scheme.
The proposed approach can provide a significant improvement
over other schemes when the relay can successfully decode the
source message.
APPENDIX A
In this appendix we provide a proof of (10). Let
X = (|hsd|
2 + |hrd|
2)P/σ2n (16)
Y = |hse|
2P/σ2n (17)
Z = |hsr|
2P/σ2n (18)
Since hij’s are complex Gaussian, i, j ∈ {s, r, d}, the proba-
bility density function of X , Y , and Z are given by
fX(x) =
exp(−x/γrd)− exp(−x/γsd)
γrd − γsd
(19)
fY (y) =
exp(−y/γse)
γse
(20)
fZ(z) =
exp(−z/γsr)
γsr
(21)
where γij = E[|hij |2]P/σ2n. Then,
Po(R) = P (min{log2(1 + Z), log2(1 +X)}
< log2(1 + Y ) + 2R) (22)
= P (log2(1 + min{X,Z})
< log2(1 + Y ) + 2R) (23)
= P (2−2R(1 + min{X,Z})− 1 < Y ) (24)
= P (2−2R(1 +X)− 1 < Y )P (Z > X)
+P (2−2R(1 + Z)− 1 < Y )P (Z < X) (25)
If 2−2R(1+X)−1 < 0 or X < 22R−1, then P (2−2R(1+X)−
1 < Y ) = 1 because Y > 0. Similarly, if 2−2R(1+Z)−1 < 0
or Z < 22R−1, then P (2−2R(1+Z)−1 < Y ) = 1. Therefore,
we get
Po(R) =
∫ 22R−1
0
fX(x)
∫
∞
x
fZ(z)dzdx
+
∫
∞
22R−1
fX(x)
∫
∞
2−2R(1+x)−1
fY (y)dy
∫
∞
x
fZ(z)dzdx
+
∫ 22R−1
0
fZ(z)
∫
∞
z
fX(x)dxdz
+
∫
∞
22R−1
fZ(z)
∫
∞
2−2R(1+z)−1
fY (y)dy
∫
∞
z
fX(x)dxdz (26)
=
γsr(1 + γsr)
(γsr + γrd)(γsr + γsd)
−
e−[(2
2R
−1)/γsr](1 + γsr)2
−2R
(γrd − γsd)γsrγse
·

 e−[(22R−1)/γrd](
2−2R
γse
+ 1γsr +
1
γrd
)(
1
γsr
+ 1γrd
)
−
e−[(2
2R
−1)/γsd](
2−2R
γse
+ 1γsr +
1
γsd
)(
1
γsr
+ 1γsd
)

 (27)
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